Prema fenomenologiji bez intencionalnosti – pokušaj druge epohé

Hrvoje Vuković - Izvorni znanstveni članak

Towards a Phenomenology without Intentionality. An Attempt at a Second Epoché

Sažetak
Rad predlaže »drugu epohé«: metodološku gestu koja, uz klasičnu suspenziju »vjerovanja u svijet«, dodatno suspendira pretpostavku nužne intencionalne strukture svijesti. Time se fenomenološka analiza otvara opisima iskustava bez jasne relacije subjekt–objekt (kontemplativna, mikrofenomenološka i prerefleksivna stanja). U temeljnom dijelu rada artikuliraju se tri ontološke figure takve svijesti: (1) Henryjeva autoafektivna imanencija života kao samoočitovanja bez distance; (2) budistička nedualna svjesnost (rigpa) kao »svjetlosna« prisutnost bez objekta; (3) kasnohusserlovska prerefleksivna jezgra vremena i afektivnosti, kao uvjet mogućnosti svakog akta. Rad ne napušta fenomenologiju, nego je radikalizira iznutra: od relacije prema neposrednosti, od korelacije prema očitovanju. Metodološki cilj nije mistifikacija, nego stroga deskripcija fenomena koji prethode intencionalnoj artikulaciji te pružaju podlogu za dijalog s neurofenomenologijom i kognitivnom znanošću. Ključna implikacija jest da intencionalnost nije konstitutivni aksiom, nego sekundarna organizacija svijesti.

Abstract
This paper proposes a »second epoché«: a methodological gesture that, beyond the classical suspension of the natural attitude, also suspends the assumption that consciousness must be intentionally structured. This opens phenomenological description to non-relational experiences (contemplative, micro-phenomenological, and pre-reflective states) lacking a clear subject–object correlation. The core argument unfolds through three ontological figures of such consciousness: (1) Michel Henry’s affective immanence of Life as self-revelation without distance; (2) Buddhist nondual awareness (rigpa) as a »uminous« presence without object; (3) late Husserl’s pre-reflective core of temporality and affectivity as the condition of possibility for any act. In this context, the paper also introduces the notion of proto-intentionality as a minimal, pre-relational orientation of consciousness. Proto-intentionality is not yet intentionality, but a structural precondition that makes intentional articulation possible without presupposing it as an ontological axiom. This concept serves to bridge the gap between immediate self-revelation and the emergence of intentional acts, and provides a point of dialogue with both contemplative traditions and contemporary cognitive science. Rather than abandoning phenomenology, the paper radicalizes it from within—from relation to immediacy, from correlation to manifestation. The aim is not mystification but rigorous description of phenomena that precede intentional articulation and support dialogue with neurophenomenology and cognitive science. The key implication is that intentionality is not a constitutive axiom but a secondary organization of consciousness.